Although Advance Selling and Probabilistic Selling differ in both motivation and implementation, we argue that they share a common characteristic-both offer consumers a choice involving buyer uncertainty. We develop a formal model to examine the general economics of purchase options that involve buyer uncertainty, explore the differences in buyer uncertainty created via these two strategies, and derive conditions under which one dominates the other. We show that the seller can address unobservable buyer heterogeneity by inducing sales involving buyer uncertainty via two different mechanisms: (1) Homogenizing heterogeneous consumers, and (2) separating heterogeneous consumers. Offering advance sales encourages customers to purchase while they are uncertain about their consumption states (more homogeneous), but offering probabilistic goods encourages customers to reveal their heterogeneity via self-selecting whether or not to purchase the uncertain product.
Introduction
Technological advances have facilitated the adoption of innovative selling strategies. In this paper, we focus on two selling strategies that have recently drawn the attention of practitioners and the marketing literature-Advance Selling (AS) and Probabilistic Selling (PS). The term "advance selling" refers to a marketing practice in which the seller offers buyers opportunities to make purchases before the time of consumption.
Until recently, research on advance selling had mainly focused on travel-related industries (e.g., airlines) and was motivated by price discrimination and yield management (e.g., Gale and Holmes 1992 , Chatwin 1999 , Biyalogorsky et al. 1999 , Biyalogorsky and Gerstner 2004 . However, recent developments in advance selling theory (e.g., Shugan and Xie 2000 , Xie and Shugan 2001 , Shugan and Xie 2005 have illustrated that the conditions required for a profit advantage from advance selling are far more general than previous thought.
Specifically, the profit advantage of advance selling does not require specific industry structures, such as capacity constraints and the existence of particular segments (i.e., leisure customers who are price-sensitive and arrive early and business customers who are price-insensitive and arrive late) that we often observe in travel-related industries. These developments bring our attention to a fundamental but under-explored consumer phenomenon existing in almost all markets: a consumer's utility from a given product or service is not fixed, but is instead affected by various personal factors such as health, mood, finances, work schedule, and family situation. For example, a Saturday night concert would be less valuable when one suffers from a headache or is facing a deadline at work; and the value of a seafood buffet dinner on a given evening depends on how much the individual craves seafood and the degree of her hunger. These personal factors are often known to the buyer but are unknown to the seller at the time of consumption, and are unknown to both in advance. 1 probabilistic movies would involve significant investments in additional infrastructure (e.g., making revisions to the ordering interfaces and writing computer code to make the random movie selection) as well as an informational campaign to make customers aware that this additional purchase option exists and what it entails.
Advance selling is another approach that might be useful to a cable company. In particular, consumers could be offered the option to order their movie well before the actual viewing. Obviously, a discount would be required to induce consumers to make advance purchases because a consumer may not know what their schedule would be ahead of time or the type of movie they'd be in the mood to see. Again, note that introducing advance purchase options would require the cable company to invest in infrastructure in order to facilitate this additional purchase option (e.g., updated interfaces, an automated pricing algorithm to reflect the discount for advance purchases, and informational campaigns to alert customers to this purchase option).
Practically speaking, the cable company would be very interested in knowing whether it would be more advantageous to introduce probabilistic products or the advance purchase option.
It is important to note that our research questions cannot be answered by existing advance selling and probabilistic selling theory because the extant models are not compatible and thus do not allow for direct comparisons between the two selling strategies. In particular, the advance selling models developed recently Xie 2000, 2005; Xie and Shugan 2001) focus on a single-product market, not multi-product markets, which is necessary for there to be buyer heterogeneity in the strength of their product preferences.
Models of probabilistic selling (Fay 2008, Fay and Xie 2008) , on the other hand, although they focus on buyer heterogeneity in the strength of their product preferences in multi-product markets, they only consider a static environment where an individual's valuations are known, i.e., they do not allow for the possibility of an advance period in which valuations are unknown to the buyer.
To address our research questions, we develop in this paper a formal model that is general enough to capture the important characteristics of a multi-product market in which both advance selling and probabilistic selling are viable strategies. Figure 1 summarizes the positioning of this paper. In particular, while previous 6 papers have separately considered the impact of buyer uncertainty about consumption states and the impact of buyer uncertainty about the product they consume, ours is the first to examine both types of buyer uncertainty in a single model. In doing so, we are able to develop a more integrative understanding of buyer uncertainty.
Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, the current paper is the first to compare the advance selling and probabilistic selling strategies.
Figure 1: Positioning of the Current Paper
The analysis of our analytical model reveals that a general benefit of offering consumers choices involving uncertainty is that doing so eases the seller's difficulty in addressing buyer heterogeneity. Buyer heterogeneity exists in all markets. For example, some customers may prefer traditional-over contemporary-style furniture, or a yoga class over tai chi, or a Friday over a Saturday concert, while others may have the opposite preferences.
Even those who have the same preferred product often differ as to the strength of their preferences. Some would be willing to pay considerably more for their preferred option than for a less preferred option (e.g., an
Eastern-Bahamas vs. a Western-Bahamas cruise), but others may be willing to pay only a slightly higher price Allow buyer uncertainty about product they consume?
Allow buyer uncertainty about product they consume?
YES NO
Recent study on advance selling e.g., Xie 2000, 2005; Xie and Shugan 2001 7 for the former than for the latter. Since an individual consumer's valuations are often unobservable to the seller, such buyer heterogeneity generally reduces profit.
Our analysis identifies two conceptually different mechanisms that use consumer choices involving uncertainty to help the seller deal with unobservable buyer heterogeneity: (1) Homogenizing heterogeneous consumers, and (2) separating heterogeneous consumers. We use advance selling and probabilistic selling as two excellent examples to illustrate these two different mechanisms. Under advance selling, the seller uses advance sales to encourage consumers to make decisions before their consumption states are known, i.e., their decisions are based on their expected rather than realized valuations, or when their valuations are more homogeneous than in the spot period. As a result, by offering consumers a choice involving uncertainty about their future consumption states, advance selling motivates buyers to make advance purchases, which effectively homogenizes heterogeneous consumers. Under probabilistic selling, the seller uses a probabilistic good to induce consumers to reveal their "type" via self-selection. As a result, probabilistic selling, by offering consumers a choice involving uncertainty about their product assignment, motivates those with weak product preferences to choose the uncertain option, which effectively separates heterogeneous consumers.
Since the underlying motivation of the two mechanisms differs substantially, their profit advantages depend on the characteristics of buyer heterogeneity of the underlying market. In particular, we characterize a two-product market via two forms of heterogeneity: (1) Max_Value-Heterogeneity, which is the variation across consumers in the valuations of their preferred goods, and (2) Strength-Heterogeneity, which is the variation across consumers in the strengths of their preferences, i.e., how much more the preferred good is valued over the less-preferred good. For example, consider a family entertainment center that offers roller skating and miniature golf. Consumers may differ in their preferred activity and how much they are willing to pay for it.
Max_Value-Heterogeneity captures the variation across consumers in how much a preferred product is valued.
Furthermore, consumers may also vary in how strongly they prefer one over the other (i.e., how much more one would be willing to pay for their preferred activity compared with that less preferred). Strength-Heterogeneity refers to the difference in relative strength between the consumer with the strongest and that with the weakest preference. Often, neither type of buyer heterogeneity is observable to the seller, which implies a potential profit disadvantage, as discussed earlier. We find that the relative profit advantage of introducing these two different types of buyer uncertainty depends on the relative strength of these two types of buyer heterogeneity. In particular, our key findings are:
First, we find that Max_Value-Heterogeneity contributes to the value of both advance selling and probabilistic selling. As the variation in consumers' valuations for their preferred products grows, the difference between traditional selling and first-degree price discrimination also grows, since the practice of charging all consumers the same price captures a smaller percentage of the available potential surplus in a market. Such an expansion in untapped surplus creates greater opportunities for alternative selling strategies such as advance selling and probabilistic selling.
Second, we find that Strength-Heterogeneity undermines the value of advance selling. Under advance selling, a consumer must commit to consuming a certain item, which may turn out to be her less-preferred product. As consumers' preferences become stronger, such a commitment imposes a greater cost on consumers and thus the seller has to charge a lower price in the advance period. Notice that the minimum possible strength preference is zero, i.e., a consumer who is indifferent when given a choice between two products. Thus, larger Strength-Heterogeneity implies that some consumers' preferences are stronger and, as a result, the value of advance selling decreases.
Third, we find that probabilistic selling is most profitable when Strength-Heterogeneity is moderate.
Probabilistic selling operates by price discriminating according to the strength of consumers' preferences, e.g., charging a higher price to consumers with stronger preferences. Thus, it is not particularly surprising that, when there is very little heterogeneity in preference strength, probabilistic selling is unsuccessful at capturing much additional surplus in a market. What may be more interesting is that probabilistic selling will be most effective in markets where Strength-Heterogeneity is not too large. Note that the probabilistic good presents consumers with the possibility of consuming either of two products and thus the price consumers are willing to pay for the probabilistic product will depend on their valuations for each of the products. As StrengthHeterogeneity rises, consumers, on average, have stronger preferences which, as noted in the previous paragraph, increase the gap between what a consumer would be willing to pay for her preferred product and what she would pay for an unknown product. Thus, greater Strength-Heterogeneity reduces the potential revenue from sales of the probabilistic good. Therefore, probabilistic selling is most advantageous when StrengthHeterogeneity is large enough to enable segmentation on the basis of preference strengths, but not so large that too few consumers are willing to purchase the probabilistic product.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present a series of examples to illustrate the relative advantages of advance selling and probabilistic selling. In Section 3, we introduce a model of demand that is sufficiently flexible to capture several of the most prominent models in the extant literature as sub-cases. In Section 4, we examine the profits when the firm only sells traditional products in the spot period and then calculate and compare the profit when the seller offers the additional option of either a probabilistic good or purchasing in advance. The Appendix contains the analytical details. In the final section, we summarize the insights from this analysis, offer concluding remarks and suggest areas for future research.
An Illustration
In this section, we identify buyer heterogeneities in a multi-product market and use a set of examples to illustrate that the relative attractiveness of advance selling and probabilistic selling can be predicted based on the characteristics of buyer heterogeneity we define.
Consider the four hypothetical markets given in 
In order to characterize the magnitude of total buyer heterogeneity and the relative importance of each type of buyer heterogeneity in a given market, we define two additional variables: (1) Total Heterogeneity (  ), which measures the total amount of buyer heterogeneity in a given market, and (2) Relative Heterogeneity Ratio ( ), which measures the proportion of buyer heterogeneity that is due to variation across consumers in the strength of their preferences (i.e., 1- measures the proportion of buyer heterogeneity that is due to variation across consumers in the value for their preferred good). Formally, Total Heterogeneity:
Relative Heterogeneity Ratio:
With these measures, we now can quantify the consumer heterogeneity presented in the four markets in As shown in Table 1 , Market 1 presents a case where consumers vary only in the strength of their preferences and they do not differ in the valuation for their preferred product (i.e., 
 The seller has no marginal costs, capacity constraints, or fixed costs to offering either advance sales or probabilistic products.
Market 1
Examining the characteristics of buyer heterogeneity and the optimal strategy shown in Table 1，we are able to identify a systematic pattern, which is stated in the following finding. Finding 1 illustrates that, using the two types of consumer heterogeneity in a multiple-products market defined in this research, we are able to predict the relative attractiveness of the three strategies for the four markets given in Table 1 . In the next two sections, we model consumer heterogeneity in a general model and illustrate that the patterns stated in Finding 1 are generally applicable (Proposition 3).
Finding 1 (based examples in

Modeling Buyer Heterogeneity in A Multi-product Market
In this section, we present a multi-product market that captures the two types of heterogeneities which were introduced in the preceding sections. To focus on the basic concepts and economic intuition, we consider a market with two symmetric products, j=1, 2, i.e., product j is the preferred product for a given consumer with a probability of ½. We assume a cost c is incurred to produce a unit of either product. To examine how buyer heterogeneities may affect the seller in a rather general setting, we construct the valuation functions, H v  and L v  , so that they are capable of capturing the various buyer heterogeneities defined above, yet flexible enough to be consistent with some prominent models of two-good markets proposed in extant studies. Specifically, we consider the following three two-product models suggested in the literature:
( 
The single-product model presented by Xie and Shugan (2001) can be viewed as a two-product market with perfect substitution (i.e., consumers have the same valuation for both products, HL vv   ) and all buyer heterogeneity is in the form of variation in the value of the preferred good. Thus, for this model,
In this standard two-good model, consumers share a common reservation value for their ideal product, but have differing tastes. In particular, consumers are located uniformly along a linear segment that stretches between the two products located at the two ends of the line (0,1). In this model, consumer 's valuation for her preferred product is: 1 HL vv   . 5 Note that while this model allows consumers to differ both in the maximum value that can be obtained from one of the two existing products and in how strongly they prefer one product over the other, it is a specific case of markets with the two types of heterogeneity (where 1 0.5 0.5
Each of these three models focuses on a special situation in markets with buyer heterogeneity. To examine the related issues more broadly, we present a more general model below, which can be reduced to each of the three two-product models discussed above.
Specifically, let R denote the lowest valuation for one's preferred product among all consumers, i.e.,
We consider the following value functions for a given consumer :
First, the value functions given in (6), though simple, are quite general, such that the three existing analytical models of two products discussed above can be viewed as special cases by varying a single parameter,  . It is easy to see that the value functions given in (6) reduce to: 
in value between her preferred and less-preferred product (i.e., HL vv   ) increases with  . This suggests that a small  represents markets with a large variation in the value of the preferred product but a small variation in consumers' preference strengths, while a large  represents markets where buyer heterogeneity is largely reflected in the strength of buyer preference but not in their valuations of the preferred product.
It is important to note that consumers are often clearer about their product preference and valuation at the time of consumption (the "spot" period), but face greater uncertainty when the consumption is in the distant future (the "advance" period). Following the literature on advance selling, we consider two periods: (1) A spot period, in which consumers are fully aware of their consumptions states, and thus also aware of their product preference and valuation; and (2) An advance period, in which consumers are aware of the distribution of their consumption states but are uncertain about their future realized product valuation. In terms of the model, consumers only know the distribution of  in the advance period, but learn their own realized value of in the spot period.
Three Selling Strategies
In this section, we examine how the characteristics of buyer heterogeneity of a given market affect the relative profit of three selling strategies: (1) Traditional Selling (TS), (2) Advance Selling (AS), and (3) Probabilistic Selling (PS). These strategies differ in when and how the products are offered for sale.
Specifically, under TS, the seller offers each specified product for sale only in the spot period. Under AS, the seller offers consumers the additional option of buying the specified products in the advance period. This strategy requires an investment of 0 AS F  , which reflects the implementation costs associated with providing a mechanism for taking advance orders and for fulfilling these advance orders. Under PS, the seller offers consumers a different additional option, that of buying a "probabilistic product"-a new type of product offering defined by Fay and Xie (2008) in which the product to be consumed is determined via a random draw of a set of distinct items, and hence is unknown to the buyer before payment. This strategy requires an Note that, mathematically, TS can be viewed as a special case of AS (i.e., when advance sales are zero) or a special case of PS (i.e., when sales for the probabilistic good are zero). 7 To facilitate comparisons, we conceptually separate these strategies by requiring a positive advance demand for the advance selling strategy and a positive demand for the probabilistic product for the probabilistic selling strategy. Precisely, the three selling strategies are defined as:
1. Traditional Selling (TS), under which the seller offers the specified products in the spot period only.
Advance Selling (AS)
, under which the seller offers the specified products in both the advance and the spot period, and is subject to a positive demand for advance sales.
Probabilistic Selling (PS)
, under which the seller offers each specified product and a "probabilistic good" in the spot period, and is subject to a positive demand for the probabilistic product.
It is interesting to recognize that, from a consumer's perspective, the three strategies differ in terms of whether or not one is facing a choice with uncertainty and, if so, what type of uncertain choice is offered.
Under the TS strategy, buyers do not face uncertainty: They know which product they will be consuming and they know their valuations for each product. Under the AS strategy, buyers are given a choice to buy in advance before they learn their product preferences and valuations, which introduces buyer uncertainty about their own consumption states. Under the PS strategy, buyers are given a choice to buy the probabilistic good that can be any one of a number of specified products, which introduces buyer uncertainty about which product they will actually receive.
In the following exposition, we assume that all consumers are willing to consider the option of purchasing in advance (but will do so only if such a purchase maximizes their expected surplus). Our objective is to derive the key economic insights with a basic model without introducing unnecessary mathematical complexity.
Traditional Selling (TS)
Under the TS strategy, the firm only sells specified products in the spot period (at prices TS j P , j = 1, 2).
Given symmetrical demand for the two goods, the optimal prices are also symmetric: 12 
TS
As shown in the Appendix, for sufficiently low costs   v cR    , the optimal price under TS is
under which the seller earns a maximum profit,
For the remainder of the paper, we assume V cR    .This condition implies that the seller is able to achieve full market coverage under TS (because R is the lowest valuation for one's preferred product among all consumers). This setting rules out any potential demand disadvantage of TS. That is, if we find AS or PS to be more advantageous than TS, such an advantage has to come from a source other than simple market expansion.
Advance Selling (AS): Homogenizing Heterogeneous Consumers
In this section, we show why and when offering consumers an option to purchase in advance can help a multi-item seller to improve profit. We first derive the optimal price and profit under AS, and then compare them with those under TS.
Advance Selling (AS)
Under the AS strategy, the seller offers consumers the option to purchase specified products both in the advance and spot periods. In the advance period, consumers are uncertain about their future consumption states. Hence, they have to make their advance purchase decisions based on their expected rather than realized valuations. Given the valuation function specified in (6), consumers' expected value of each product is:
Consumers will buy in the advance period if they receive an equal or higher surplus from advance purchase than from waiting for the spot period, which clearly depends on buyer expectations about the spot price. The advance selling literature (e.g., Shugan 2001, Shugan and Xie 2005) suggests that a seller is capable of committing in advance to announced spot prices if the latter are observable at the time when customers are making advance purchases. Note that this applies to most advance selling markets, because sellers often offer "Advance Price" and "Gate Price" simultaneously (e.g., tickets for concerts, sport games, amusement parks, and exhibitions, or registration fees for conferences, recreation activities, and professional training classes). Following this reasoning, we allow such seller credibility. When all consumers arrive in the advance period, the most profitable way to generate positive advance sales is to set sufficiently high spot prices
), which eliminates any incentive for consumers to delay purchasing until the spot period (see the Appendix for further details). Consequently, consumers will purchase in advance if the advance price is no larger than the expected value of a given product. Hence, the profit under AS is: 
As shown in Lemma A1, the optimal advance price is 2 4
Why and When Advance Selling Can Help
Proposition 1 summarizes the key results from this comparing the AS strategy to the TS strategy. Previous studies Xie 2000, Xie and Shugan 2001) have illustrated that, in a single-product market, AS can improve profit because offering advance sales motivates consumers to transact with the seller in the advance period when they are more homogenous (i.e., before they realize their individual consumption states for each product due to their own idiosyncratic preferences). Our model extends this analysis to a multiple product setting. Unlike the case of a single product, however, in a multi-product market, consumers have to decide not only WHEN to buy but also WHICH product to buy. Also, when facing multiple alternatives, consumers differ not only in their valuation for any given product but also in the strength of their product preferences. These differences lead to some intriguing new findings about advance selling. Specifically, Proposition 1 reveals that a multi-product seller can benefit from homogenizing demand via offering advance sales only in markets where buyers significantly differ in their valuation for their preferred products (i.e., a high Max_Value-Heterogeneity), but do not vary greatly in the strength of their product preferences. i.e., all consumers pay the same low price, although many have higher valuations. The larger the variation in consumers' maximum willingness to pay, the more money would be left on the table under TS, and the more the seller can gain by transacting with consumers before such buyer heterogeneity is realized. Second, an increase in Strength-Heterogeneity makes it harder to achieve a profit advantage from AS , see the proof in the Appendix). Unlike a single product market, however, in a multi-product market, an advance sale not only requires a commitment to purchase, it also requires a commitment to purchase a certain product. A sufficiently high s  implies that consumers differ significantly as to how much more they value their preferred product compared with that less preferred. Hence, making a purchase without knowing their future consumption states involves a high opportunity cost because some advance buyers will be committing to consume a product which may turn out to have a much lower value than their preferred product. The expectation that one may receive a very low-valued product diminishes consumers' willingness to purchase in advance (i.e., EV in (8) decreases with  ), and thus increases the cost of inducing advance purchase.
Taking the two conditions together, the multi-product seller benefits from the demand homogenization function of AS only when the seller suffers a significant profit loss under TS (i.e., v  is large) but is not subject to a significant cost of inducing advance sales (i.e., s  is small).
Probabilistic Selling: Separating Heterogeneous Consumers
In this section, we show why and when offering consumers an additional option to buy a probabilistic good can help a multi-item seller to improve profit.
Probabilistic Selling (PS)
Under this selling strategy, the seller gives consumers the option to purchase a probabilistic good.
Thus, in the spot period, the firm sells both specified products (at PS j P ) and a probabilistic, or "opaque," good (at PS O P ), for which a buyer will be randomly assigned product 1 or product 2. Fay and Xie (2008) provide extensive analyses to demonstrate that a seller typically finds an equal probability of assignments optimal under various demand conditions. We allow consumers to expect such an optimal decision by the seller. Thus, the expected value to consumer  for the opaque good equals the average value of the two specified products, o v  :
Given the symmetric demand function, the optimal prices for the specified products are 
Lemma A1 in the Appendix presents the optimal prices and profit under PS. From Lemma A1, we calculate:
Why and When Probabilistic Selling Can Help
We now compare the PS and TS strategies. Proposition 2 summarizes the key results. Max_Value-Heterogeneity, and (ii) the benefit of market segmentation, and (2) reduces profit from the sales of the probabilistic good. As discussed earlier, PS separates heterogeneous consumers based on the strength of their product preferences, i.e., selling the specified goods at full price to those with strong preferences and selling the probabilistic good at a discounted price to those with weak preferences. On the one hand, such a segmentation benefit increases with Strength-Heterogeneity, because a higher level of buyer variation in the strengths of their product preferences increases the seller's information disadvantage under TS, thus increasing the potential for PS to improve profit.
Proposition 2 (Probabilistic Selling vs. Traditional Selling) (a) Offering consumers the choice to purchase a probabilistic good allows a multi-product seller to separate heterogeneous consumers. (b) Such separation increases profit if the market possesses (i) sufficient
On the other hand, for any given level of Max_Value-Heterogeneity, an increase in Strength-Heterogeneity implies an increase in buyer product value variation for their less preferred product. Since the price of the probabilistic good must be low enough to attract the marginal consumer who is indifferent between purchasing the probabilistic good or the full price product, too much buyer value variation for the less preferred product implies either a low price or low sales for the probabilistic good.
The finding that too much heterogeneity in product preference strength may actually destroy the profit advantage of PS is not intuitive, especially given that the profit advantage of PS is fundamentally motivated by the existence of such heterogeneity in preference strength. We are able to undercover this new and important feature of PS because our model explicitly characterizes the buyer heterogeneity of a given market in two different dimensions.
Homogenization or Separation: Advance Selling vs. Probabilistic Selling
The preceding analysis illustrates that, while both AS and PS create buyer uncertainty, these two types of uncertainty help the seller via fundamentally different economic mechanisms: AS homogenizes heterogeneous consumers by motivating them to purchase before their heterogeneity is realized, while PS separates heterogeneous consumers by motivating them to reveal their heterogeneity. Next, we derive conditions under which homogenization helps the seller more than separation, where neither is advantageous, and where the two strategies can be perfect substitutes. Proposition 3 and Corollary 1 summarize our main findings. Formally, AS is optimal ifˆ    and ˆ <  ; PS is optimal if    and ˆ < < ; Otherwise, TS is optimal.
Closed-form expressions for ˆ, , , and   are provided in the Appendix.
Corollary 1 (Equality of AS and PS)
The seller can achieve the same profit improvement by homogenizing or separating heterogeneous consumers in markets with sufficient total buyer heterogeneity and a moderate amount of both types of buyer heterogeneity. Formally,
Proposition 3 reveals that the optimal strategy critically depends on two variables that characterize buyer heterogeneity in the market: (a) The total amount of buyer heterogeneity that exists (  ), and (b) the relative importance of the two types of buyer heterogeneity (  ). We illustrate the results of Proposition 3 in Figure 2 .
As shown in Figure 2 , with too little total variation across consumers ( min    ), TS is optimal regardless of the relative importance of the two types of buyer heterogeneity ( 01   ). When there is sufficient total buyer heterogeneity ( min    ), however, the seller may benefit from offering uncertainty choices to consumers, but the best type of uncertainty depends critically on the source of the consumer heterogeneity.
Specifically, in markets where buyers differ substantially in their valuations for their preferred product rather than in the strengths of their product preference (  ), then the seller should introduce the advance purchase option. In markets where both types of buyer heterogeneity are sufficiently high ( ), it is As discussed earlier, with sufficient total variation across consumers (a large  ), the seller suffers significantly from uncertainty under TS, which creates opportunities for profit improvement via AS or PS.
However, these two strategies are most beneficial in very diverse situations. AS is more effective than PS at addressing Max_Value-Heterogeneity. However, PS is better than AS at capitalizing on Strength-Heterogeneity.
Under AS, the seller forces consumers to commit to purchase prior to learning their individual product valuations. Since consumers do not know their spot valuations, they decide whether or not to purchase based on expected, or average, values and thus the impact of Max_Value-Heterogeneity is minimized. On the other hand, under PS, purchase decisions are made after valuations are realized. PS enables the firm to segment customers according to the strength of their preferences, i.e., consumers self-select into purchasing the probabilistic product or the specified products. Such price discrimination is not feasible under AS since purchase decisions are made prior to consumers knowing the strength of their preferences.
An intriguing result of our analysis is that it is possible for the seller to benefit equally from offering consumers either an option to purchase in advance or an option to purchase a probabilistic product (Corollary 1), even though the two product offerings work very differently, i.e., homogenizing demand under AS and separating demand under PS. In effect, there is a trade-off between addressing Max_Value-Heterogeneity (at which AS is better) and addressing Strength-Heterogeneity (which is only possible through PS). With a moderate amount of both types of buyer heterogeneity, these two effects balance out, and thus the seller equally benefits from introducing either additional product offering. When *    , this equivalent advantage is equal to the investment cost in either AS or PS. Thus, investing in either AS or PS is optimal as long as the Total Heterogeneity is sufficiently large, i.e., *    .
Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we study two selling strategies, Advance Selling and Probabilistic Selling, which have the common characteristic of helping the seller address buyer heterogeneity by inducing sales involving buyer uncertainty. In this section, we first discuss some of the important insights derived from our analysis. Then, we conclude the paper by offering suggestions for future research.
New Insights
Impact of Buyer Heterogeneity: Homogenizing or Separating Heterogeneous Consumers
Our analysis demonstrates that a seller may be able to improve profit by addressing buyer heterogeneity in profoundly different ways. In particular, the AS strategy offers consumers a choice of buying in an advance period while they are uncertain about their future consumption states, which allows the seller to aggregate consumers who would be differentiated at a later point in time. In contrast, under the PS strategy, the seller offers consumers an additional purchase option where the product assignment is unknown to them. This strategy allows the seller to separate consumers into two segments-one group that strongly prefers one product over the other, and one group that only has weak preferences between the two specified products.
Various other mechanisms, such as coupons (Narasimhan 1984; Gerstner, Hess, and Holthausen 1994) , quantity discounts (Oi 1971; Dolan 1987) , and versioning (Varian 2000) rely on a similar approach (but utilize different sources of buyer heterogeneity) to segment consumers. Importantly, our analysis, especially Proposition 3, provides insight into the conditions under which aggregating is more profitable than separating, and vice versa.
A parallel can be drawn between these results and those from the bundling literature. Pure bundling is a method of aggregating consumers. Such aggregation is beneficial to the seller if demand for the bundle is more homogenous than is demand for each individual item, as would be the case if an individual's valuations for the items are negatively correlated (Adams and Yellen 1976) or if the bundle consists of a very large number of items and each valuation is drawn independently from a common distribution (Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1999) .
On the other hand, mixed bundling induces consumers to self-select whether to purchase the bundle or individual items, thus allowing the seller to separate customers according to unobserved heterogeneity. Such separation is advantageous when values for the bundle and individual items vary significantly across consumers, as would be the case if item valuations are not negatively correlated (McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston 1989) or consumers tend to be knowledgeable about what items they value, which is only a small subset of the full bundle (Basu and Vitharana 2009) . Similar to mixed bundling, a menu of bundles can be used to separate heterogeneous consumers (Kolay and Shaffer 2003) .
Dealing with a Seller's Uncertainty: Reducing or Revealing Buyer Heterogeneity
It is also interesting to note that the AS and PS strategies represent very different ways in which a seller can deal with its information disadvantage, i.e., the fact that consumers know their valuations and product preferences in the spot period, but the seller does not. One approach is to try to eliminate this informational asymmetry. When sales are made in advance, the seller and the consumers have the same information, i.e., they both only know the distribution of preferences, not an individual's spot valuation. A second approach to dealing with an information advantage is to try to minimize the effects of this informational disadvantage. In particular, offering a probabilistic good encourages consumers to reveal the strength of their preferences, thus allowing the seller to charge differentiated prices to consumers who have unobservable heterogeneities. Our results indicate that reducing heterogeneity is advantageous in markets where buyer heterogeneity is largely due to Max_Value-Heterogeneity but not to Strength-Heterogeneity. However, inducing consumers to reveal their differences is optimal in markets where the two types of heterogeneity are more balanced. Finally, neither strategy can enhance profit in markets where Max_Value-Heterogeneity is not sufficiently large.
Future Research
Probabilistic selling is a new marketing strategy that to date has received only limited attention.
Therefore, many interesting questions remain. For instance, it would be interesting to incorporate risk aversion into future analysis. Attitudes towards the probabilistic good depend not only on the strength of one's preferences (as accounted for in this current paper), but also on one's disposition towards risk. Probabilistic selling may enable the seller to discriminate according to variation in risk aversion. Another possible direction to pursue is to consider how advance selling and probabilistic selling differ in terms of their ability to enhance capacity utilization. For instance, previous research has shown that probabilistic selling (Fay and Xie 2008) and advance selling Holmes 1992, 1993) , separately, can be useful tools for a seller facing demand uncertainty and capacity constraints. However, it would be interesting to consider the conditions under which one selling strategy is preferred over the other and whether these tools can be used in conjunction with each other. Under 1 st Degree Price Discrimination, the seller provides each customer with her preferred product at a price equal to the valuation of that product. Thus, the total revenue obtained from the three customers equals:
Under TS, a consumer purchases product 1 if 11 PP to maximize its profit given this demand.
TS vP
Under AS , in the advance period, the consumer does not know which type (A, B, or C) she will be or which product will be preferred. Thus, she will purchase in advance only if EV-EV AS j waiting P  , where
EV waiting is the expected consumer surplus from waiting to purchase until the spot period (in which valuations will be known). Notice that each consumer has the same expectations in the advance period. Thus, either all customers wish to purchase in the advance period or none do. AS is only distinct from TS if purchases occur in the advance period. Thus, we report in Table A1 , the profit for AS assuming the price is set such that customers prefer to purchase in advance. Under AS, the seller's profit is: 
 is defined as the smallest  that will purchase the opaque good:
.  is defined as the  who is indifferent between purchasing her preferred good and purchasing the opaque good:
Substituting these formulas for prices into (A2), the seller maximizes profit with respect to L  and  . Taking the derivative of profit w.r.t.
L
 and setting it equal to zero, we find:
, which is less than zero if condition (A3) is met:
8 Other papers have considered the impact of even larger marginal costs on the advance selling strategy Xie 2000, Xie and Shugan 2001) and on the probabilistic selling strategy (Fay and Xie 2008) . The key finding is that if costs are too large, the seller will not benefit from allowing advance purchases or introducing probabilistic products. 9 As shown in the preceding section, the seller maximizes profit by choosing large enough spot prices such that EV 0 waiting  (i.e., spot prices in excess of Max H v     so that consumers do not have any incentive to wait until the spot period to purchase).
Since we are focusing on the cases where the differences between selling strategies cannot be explained by market expansion effects, we assume (A3) holds (which is a more restrictive assumption than (A1)     The optimal prices and resulting profit is reported in Lemma A1.
Lemma A1 records the optimal prices and the resulting profit for these three selling strategies.
Lemma A1 (Optimal price and profit)
The seller's optimal prices and profit under the three selling strategies are given below: . We assume 2 AS F   so that it is possible for the benefit of introducing advance sales to exceed the implementation cost of offering products in advance.
Proof of Proposition 2
Using Lemma A1, we can compare the profit under PS and TS:
  
Proof of Proposition 3 When the Probabilistic Selling Strategy is optimal
Equation (A10) provides the condition under which PS outperforms TS. For PS to be optimal, it must also yield higher profits than AS. Using Lemma A1, we can compare these profits: 
